Some remarks on the mentalistic reformulation of the measurement
  problem. A reply to S. Gao by Oldofredi, Andrea
ar
X
iv
:1
90
1.
05
27
2v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
16
 Ja
n 2
01
9
Some remarks on the mentalistic reformulation of
the measurement problem. A reply to S. Gao
Andrea Oldofredi∗
January 17, 2019
Abstract
Gao (2017) presents a new mentalistic reformulation of the well-known measure-
ment problem affecting the standard formulation of quantum mechanics. According
to this author, it is essentially a determinate-experience problem, namely a prob-
lem about the compatibility between the linearity of the Schrödinger’s equation,
the fundamental law of quantum theory, and definite experiences perceived by con-
scious observers. In this essay I aim to clarify (i) that the well-known measurement
problem is a mathematical consequence of quantum theory’s formalism, and that
(ii) its mentalistic variant does not grasp the relevant causes which are responsible
for this puzzling issue. The first part of this paper will be concluded claiming that
the “physical” formulation of the measurement problem cannot be reduced to its
mentalistic version. In the second part of this work it will be shown that, contrary
to the case of quantum mechanics, Bohmian mechanics and GRW theories provide
clear explanations of the physical processes responsible for the definite localization
of macroscopic objects and, consequently, for well-defined perceptions of measure-
ment outcomes by conscious observers. More precisely, the macro-objectification of
states of experimental devices is obtained exclusively in virtue of their clear ontolo-
gies and dynamical laws without any intervention of human observers. Hence, it
will be argued that in these theoretical frameworks the measurement problem and
the determinate-experience problem are logically distinct issues.
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1 Introduction: A “mentalistic” version of the Measure-
ment Problem
Gao (2017) presents a new mentalistic reformulation of the well-known Measurement
Problem (MP) affecting the standard formulation of Quantum Mechanics (QM). Ac-
cording to this author, the MP is essentially a determinate-experience problem, namely
a problem about the compatibility between the linearity of the Schrödinger’s Equation
(SE), the fundamental law of quantum theory, and the definite experiences perceived
by conscious observers. More precisely, Gao states that the physical formulation of the
issue contained in Maudlin (1995a), considered a precise description of the problem in
the philosophical literature, does not capture the substantial core of the MP, for it lit-
erally ignores the existing psycho-physical connections between definite perceptions of
measurements outcome by conscious observers on the one hand, and the linear dynam-
ics of the SE on the other. Therefore, the MP should be properly characterized as a
determinate-experience problem:
[t]he problem is not only to explain how the linear dynamics can be compati-
ble with the appearance of definite measurement results obtained by physical
devices, but also, and more importantly, to explain how the linear dynam-
ics can be compatible with the existence of definite experiences of conscious
observers (Gao (2017), p. 4).
It is worth noting that in his essay Gao makes two strong statements (among others):1
he writes not only that a mentalistic version of the MP is more “appropriate” to better
understand the real problem of measurement in the context of quantum theory, but also
that Maudlin’s formulation is reduced to his mentalistic variant (“Maudlin’s formulation
will reduce to the new formulation”, Gao (2017), p. 5). Hence, in order to evaluate
these claims, let us introduce the mentalistic measurement problem, which arises from
the incompatibility among the following statements:
1. The mental state of an observer supervenes on her wave function;
2. The wave function evolves according to the SE;
3. A measurement yields a single mental state representing a single outcome.
1I assume that the reader is familiar with the content of Gao’s and Maudlin’s papers.
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The proof of this inconsistency is given in Gao (2017), p. 4 and follows accurately
the logical steps of Maudlin (1995a), p. 7-8.
The different physical solutions to the MP, Bohmian Mechanics (BM), Many Worlds
Interpretation (MWI) and the spontaneous collapse theories (here we will consider the
original Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) theory and its extensions GRWm and GRWf,
which postulate a matter density field and a flash ontology respectively) represent in
Gao’s account diverse forms of psychophysical connections. Against this background, the
author analyzes each of them in order to establish (i) whether and how these solutions
satisfy the principle of psychophysical supervenience, and (ii) how observers’ mental
states supervene on their wave function. It follows, then, that a satisfactory solution of
the mentalistic MP will have to explain how a conscious observer will perceive a definite
experience of a given measurement outcome. Alternatively stated, Gao requires from a
satisfactory solution to the MP that the physical state obtained as a measurement result
must be the physical state on which the mental state of a conscious observer supervenes.
Analyzing these different sorts of psychophysical connection and their implications Gao
argues that
the forms of psycho-physical connection required by Everett’s and Bohm’s
theories have potential problems, while an analysis of how the mental state of
an observer supervenes of her wave function may help to solve the structured
tails problem of collapse theories. This seems to suggest that collapse theories
may be in the right direction to solve the measurement problem (Gao (2017),
p. 11).
The aim of this essay is twofold: on the one hand, I will criticize Gao’s starting
assumption according to which the MP is inherently a determinate-experience problem,
and thus I will object that his mentalistic variant is more appropriate with respect to
the physical formulation of the issue, rejecting also the reduction of the MP to his new
formulation (Section 2). On the other, it will be shown that, contrary to the case of
standard quantum mechanics, BM and GRW theories provide clear explanations of the
physical processes responsible for the definite localization of macroscopic objects and,
consequently, for well-defined perceptions of measurement outcomes by conscious ob-
servers (Sections 3 and 4).2 More specifically, I will argue that looking carefully at their
physical content, measurement results - e.g. macroscopic states of classical experimental
devices - are obtained unambiguously from the microscopic dynamics without any inter-
vention of human observers. Furthermore, these theories guarantee, in virtue of their
Primitive Ontology (PO) and dynamical laws, that observers’ mental states will super-
vene on well localized physical states representing measurement outcomes, in agreement
with Gao’s requirements stated above. Consequently, observers’ conscious perceptions
of macroscopic states are always well-defined in BM and GRW.
Finally, I will argue that in BM and GRW theories the physical formulation of the
MP is not reduced to this new mentalistic version. The latter, ultimately, is not relevant
in order to evaluate and understand how these theories effectively solve the MP. The
last section concludes the paper.
2In this paper I will concentrate only on Bohmian mechanics and GRW theories since they have a
clear primitive ontology of matter, contrary to MWI.
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2 The Problem of Measurement in Quantum Mechanics
Generally speaking quantum mechanics may be defined as a theoretical framework pro-
viding an algorithm able to describe the objects composing our world at the microphys-
ical regime, i.e. atoms, molecules, subatomic particles such nucleons or electrons, and
their motion in space and time.
According to the von Neumann-Dirac formulation of the theory, a quantum system is
described by a state vector |ψ〉 which is an element of a complex vector space, the Hilbert
space H, providing a complete specification of its properties. Equivalently, considering
Schrödinger’s wave mechanics, the physical state of a quantum object is described by
a wave function ψ, a complex valued function defined in 3N -dimensional configuration
space. The wave function of a given system contains all information about its state,
providing its complete description. In QM only operationally accessible (i.e. measur-
able) properties are considered magnitudes of quantum systems; these are represented
by Hermitian operators A. The possible values of a given measurable quantity A are
real numbers called eigenvalues of the associated operator A, whereas possible states in
which a system may be found after a measurement of A are represented by the eigen-
states/eigenvectors of A. This is the well-known eigenvalue-eigenstate link, a central
tenet of quantum mechanics. Dirac’s wrote illuminating words on this point:
The expression that an observable ‘has a particular value’ for a particular
state is permissible in quantum mechanics in the special case when a mea-
surement of the observable is certain to lead to the particular value, so that
the state is in an eigenstate of the observable [. . . ]. In the general case we
cannot speak of an observable having a value for a particular state, but we
can speak of its having an average value for the state. We can go further and
speak of the probability of its having any specified value for the state, mean-
ing the probability of this specified value being obtained when one makes a
measurement of the observable (Dirac (1947), p. 253).
This quote eloquently characterizes the idea that quantum systems in isolation, i.e. not
subject to experimental observations, do not instantiate properties with definite values.
Consequently, it follows from the formalism of the theory that quantum mechanical
objects possess indefinite properties prior measurements, a crucial ontological difference
with respect to their classical counterparts.
The last axiom of QM needed in our discussion concern the dynamics of physical
systems. The evolution in space and time of quantum systems is governed by the already
mentioned Schrödinger’s equation, a deterministic linear partial differential equation:
i~
∂
∂t
|ψ〉 = Hˆ|ψ〉, (1)
where i is the imaginary unit, ~ the reduced Planck constant and Hˆ is the Hamiltonian
operator representing the total energy of the system. The Hamiltonian operator is
particularly important being the generator of the time evolution of quantum systems.
Among the properties of SE, linearity plays a major role for the definition of the
MP: if two state vectors |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉 (or wave functions ψ1, ψ2) are both possible solutions
of the same SE, then their linear combination (superposition) |ψ〉s = α|ψ1〉 + β|ψ2〉
(ψs = αψ1 + βψ2) is still a solution of the same SE.
3 Thus, the new superposed state
3Here |α|2, |β|2, with α, β ∈ C, represent the probabilities to find the system in |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉 respectively.
The normalization |α|2+|β|2 = 1 means that with certainty we will find the system in one of the possible
eigenstates.
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|ψ〉s is also a consistent representation of the system.
Now suppose to measure the z-spin of a quantum particle. In this particular case
there are only two admissible eigenstates “z-spin-up” and “z-spin-down”; from linearity,
nonetheless, it follows that also the superposition “z-spin-up and z-spin-down” is a
consistent description of the state in which the particle may be (i.e. it is completely
admitted by the theory’s formalism as a proper description of a physical state of a certain
system). This entails that prior to a spin measurement the particle has indefinite spin,
being neither in the z-spin-up state nor in the z-spin-down state; formally, this situation
can be translated into the familiar equation:
|ψz〉 = 1√
2
(| ↑z〉+ | ↓z〉). (2)
As we will see, assuming (i) that state vectors/wave functions provide a complete
description of quantum systems and (ii) that their motion is uniquely and completely
described by the SE, the superposed states would have been amplified to the macro-
scopic scale. Since also the behaviour of the macro-apparatus, the experimental device,
must obey the fundamental laws of QM being constituted by a huge number of quantum
particles, it follows that macroscopic objects can be in superposition, contradicting em-
pirical evidence, i.e. uniqueness and definiteness of measurement outcomes. This is in
essence of the famous measurement problem of quantum theory. Schematically, it may
be stated as follows:
P. 1 State vectors provide a complete description of quantum systems;
P. 2 State vectors evolve according to the linear dynamical equation (1);
P. 3 Measurements have a unique determinate outcome.
Any pair of these propositions is consistent and entails the falsity of the third one,
but their conjunction generates inconsistencies with experimental evidence. For a simple
proof of this statement the reader should refer to Maudlin (1995a), p. 7-8. It is worth
noting that observers do not play any role in the definition of the measurement problem.
In the remainder of this section it will be made clear where they enter into the scene.
In order to show explicitly how quantum superpositions amplify to the macroscopic
regime, let’s consider again equation (2). Suppose that prior to the measurement of the
particle’s spin the in z-direction we have the following situation:
∑
i
ci|ψi〉 ⊗ |A0〉,
where
∑
i ci|ψi〉 refers to the two possible eigenstates in the r.h.s. of (2), and |A0〉 to
the experimental apparatus in its ready state, i.e. a macroscopic pointer pointing in a
neutral direction before the measurement. Due to the linearity of (1), one obtains the
following result as a mathematical consequence:
∑
i
ci|ψi〉 ⊗ |A0〉 =⇒
∑
i
ci|ψi〉 ⊗ |Ai〉 (3)
where
∑
i ci|ψi〉 ⊗ |Ai〉 represent the entangled state between the quantum system and
the experimental device. It is crucial to underline that equation (3) does neither de-
scribe a macroscopic apparatus pointing to a definite direction i, nor a quantum object
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with a definite state/value for the property of spin in the z-direction. Only when the
experimenter decides to perform a measurement of the particle’s spin the superposition
present in (3) will collapse.
However, since in experimental observations such superpositions are never revealed,
the von Neumann-Dirac formulation of quantum mechanics introduces a second stochas-
tic dynamical law: the postulate of the projection of the state vector, also known as the
wave function collapse. Essentially, given the structure of the MP presented above, one
may state that the standard solution offered by this approach to QM is to reject P.
2, according to which the dynamical behaviour of quantum systems is completely de-
scribed by the SE. In our example, the act of observation of the particle’s z-spin - i.e.
the interaction between the quantum particle and the experimental apparatus - causes
a suppression of the Schrödinger’s evolution with the consequent stochastic jump of the
system in one of the two possible spin eigenstates. These stochastic “jumps” make QM
inherently probabilistic. Dirac viewed them as “unavoidable disturbance” of quantum
systems in measurement situations:
When we measure a real dynamical variable ξ, belonging to the eigenvalue
ξ′, the disturbance involved in the act of measurement causes a jump in the
state of the dynamical system. From physical continuity, if we make a second
measurement of the same dynamical variable immediately after the first, the
result of the second measurement must be the same as the first. Thus after
the first measurement has been made, there is no indeterminacy in the result
of the second. Hence after the first measurement is made, the system is in
an eigenstate of the dynamical variable ξ, [. . . ]. In this way, we see that
a measurement always causes the system to jump into an eigenstate of the
dynamical variable that is being measured, the eigenvalue this eigenstate
belongs to being equal to the result of the first measurement (Dirac (1947),
p. 36).
Clearly, the projection postulate is essential to reconcile the postulates of quantum
theory with experimental evidence and practice. In fact, stating that quantum systems
are subjected to stochastic jumps when they interact with measurement devices, causing
the instantaneously suppression of the unitary evolution, implies that these interactions
have the macroscopic effect to correlate the state of the experimental apparatus with the
eigenstate (and relative eigenvalue) in which the quantum system will be found, so that
one can actually observe definite measurement results. This is the content and enormous
utility of the projection postulate.
Without this stochastic dynamical law QM would be inadequate to describe mea-
surement outcomes, being able only to describe the evolution of physical systems in
isolation (a very limited success for a fundamental physical theory). Nonetheless, al-
though the projection postulate makes the quantum formalism consistent with exper-
imental evidence, it does not provide a satisfactory solution to the MP. In the first
place, it notoriously implies an indispensable, arbitrary and not precisely defined divi-
sion between the micro- and macroscopic regimes. Secondly, the notion of measurement,
albeit pivotal within the axioms of QM and taken as an unexplained primitive concept,
is neither mathematically nor physically well-defined, i.e. there are no variables in the
equations of the theory referring the notions of measurement or observer (for a detailed
analysis of these issues the reader may refer to Bell (1987)). In the third place, the phys-
ical processes which causes the collapse of the wave functions are not described, with
the consequence that interactions occurring in measurements processes do not receive
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a physically meaningful explanation. More precisely, the physical processes responsible
for the suppression of the Schrödinger evolution are left unexplained: the stochasticity
of quantum jumps, although efficient, seems to be a pragmatical rule introduced ad hoc
in order to tame inconsistencies with respect to observed experimental facts. In addi-
tion, there is no explanation of what distinguishes a measurement interaction from a
non-measurement interaction:
[w]hat the traditional theory did not do is state, in clear physical terms, the
conditions under which the non-linear evolution takes place. There were, of
course, theorems that if one puts in collapses somewhere between the micro-
scopic and the macroscopic, then, for all practical purposes, it doesn’t much
matter where they are put in. But if the linear evolution which governs the
development of the fundamental object in one’s physical theory occasionally
breaks down or suspends itself in favor of a radically different evolution, then
it is a physical question of the first order exactly under what circumstances,
and in what way, the breakdown occurs. The traditional theory papered over
this defect by describing the collapses in terms of imprecise notions such as
“observation” or “measurement” (Maudlin (1995a), p. 9).
Finally, the nature of quantum objects is ontologically obscure. From QM it follows that
generally prior to any measurement, the operator associated to the observable property
under consideration does not have any fixed value. Thus, one concludes that quantum
systems have indefinite properties before the performance of a measurement of a given
observable. Alternatively stated, we might better say that the measurement in quantum
mechanics does not reveal existing properties of quantum systems. Thus, quantum
systems are objects whose properties depend contextually on the different experimental
situations.
From our discussion of the measurement problem it is possible to draw some conclusions:
• If one accepts the validity of the quantum mechanical postulates and their stan-
dard interpretation, i.e. the formal structure of the theory, the MP is just a direct
mathematical consequence deriving from the amplification of microscopic superpo-
sitions to the macroscopic scale. This, in turn, translates into a physical problem
since these macroscopic superpositions are never observed, making the theory inad-
equate to describe empirical evidence. It is worth noting that, in order to define the
problem of measurement, there is no necessity to introduce a conscious observer.
Hence, it seems that the physical formulation of the MP cannot be simply reduced
to its mentalistic variant. The latter does not seem to be the correct version of
the problem, since the MP does not regard conscious perceptions of human beings
but rather the microscopic physical processes which generate definite macroscopic
states of the experimental devices.
• The collapse postulate affirms that the interactions occurring performing mea-
surements suppress the Schrödinger evolution and cause the reduction of the wave
packet in one of the possible eigenstates of the measured observable. The stochastic
jump of the wave function, thus, generates a definite macroscopic outcome. Hence,
it is certain that the physical state on which the mental state of a conscious ob-
server supervenes is macroscopically well-defined: it is the very act of observation
which causes the definiteness of the macroscopic apparatus. Clearly, then, an ob-
server will have a definite experience of the measurement outcome. More precisely,
if one interprets literally the projection postulate, then one is forced to accept that
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the act of observation by an observer instantaneously causes the suppression of the
Schrödinger evolution, i.e. the act of observation is simultaneous to the macro-
objectification of a definite state of the experimental device. Thus, the brain of
a human observer does not have the physical time to observe a superposition of
macroscopic states. Hence, it follows that an observer observes a definite macro-
scopic state also in the context of standard quantum mechanics. This fact, in
turn, implies that the macroscopic physical state obtained after a measurement is
exactly the state of which an observer has a direct perception. By definition of
the projection postulate, then, both the macroscopic state and the observer’s con-
scious perception will be well-defined. The difficulties related to this postulate are
expressed above, but they do not concern the mental states of conscious obersers.
Trivially, without projection postulate one has to face also a “mentalistic MP”: if
we accept P. 1, P. 2 and P. 3, then we have to explain also how a human observer
will have a definite perception of a well-defined measurement outcome.
• Although historically the consciousness of a human observer has been introduced
by von Neumann and Wigner in order to break the macroscopic superposition
present in the r.h.s. of (3), one has to keep in firmly mind that a human observer
is only one type of observer, as Bell and Feynman among others pointed out. In
fact, there is no clear definition of what an observer may be: it could be any thing
that performs measurements, e.g. a Geiger counter, not necessarily a rational
agent with mental states.
In conclusion, it seems that the MP is strictly related to the macro-objectification of
well-defined physical states from a microscopic not clear dynamics, rather than related
to conscious human experiences. Therefore, Gao’s analysis does not provide a better,
or more exact exposition of the issue, since it lacks a clear discussion of the formal and
physical reasons which cause the MP in the first place.
In the next sections we will analyze how Bohmian mechanics and the spontaneous
collapse theories solve this foundational issue. In these contexts observers (human or
not) do not play any role since the MP is solved in virtue of their clear ontologies and
dynamical laws. Furthermore, we will see how in these frameworks the determinate-
experience problem simply vanishes.
3 Solution I: Bohmian Mechanics
It is an established fact that according to BM observers do not play any role in mea-
surement situations.4 An experimenter in a Bohmian universe, i.e. a universe described
by BM, can perform a measurement, leave the laboratory and be completely certain
that, given the structure of the theory provided by its primitive ontology and dynamical
laws, a definite outcome will be obtained. In this section I will schematically explain the
basic elements which characterize the theory of measurement in the context of Bohmian
mechanics.
BM provides a complete description of quantum systems via the introduction of ad-
ditional variables, i.e. particles’ positions, to the wave function. In this theory physical
systems are represented by a couple (Q(t), ψ(t)), where Q(t) = (Q1(t), . . . , QN (t)) de-
scribes an actual N -particle configuration at an arbitrary time t, and the latter is the
4For significant literature about the role of observers in BM the reader may refer to Bohm (1952),
Dürr et al. (2013), Dürr and Teufel (2009), Chapter 9, Bricmont (2016), Chapter 5, Passon (2018).
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configuration’s wave function. As a consequence, Bohmian particles follow definite tra-
jectories in physical space R3, contrary to the objects of standard quantum mechanics.
The dynamics of BM is fully described by two equations of motion. The wave function
ψ evolves in 3N -configuration space according to the unitary evolution provided by (1),
whereas the particles’ behaviour is governed by the so-called guidance equation:
dQk
dt
=
~
mk
Im
ψ∗∇kψ
ψ∗ψ
(Q1, . . . , QN ) = v
ψ
k (Q1, . . . , QN ). (4)
Evidently the vector velocity field on the r.h.s. depends on the wave function, whose
role is to guide the motion of the particles in physical space on the one hand, and to
determine the statistical distribution of the particles’ positions on the other. Finally, the
Born’s rule is preserved in BM, making its predictions empirically equivalent to those of
QM.5
To understand the Bohmian solution to the MP let us consider a wave function in
a superposition of two states corresponding to the possible eigenstates of a two-valued
operator O, say L and R with eigenvalues “left” and “right” (a situation analogous to
our previous example of a particle’s spin in the z-direction):
ψ =
1√
2
(ψL + ψR).
According to this theory, a particular experimental situation is represented by a couple
(X,Y ) ∈ R3M × R3(N−M) where the former variable refers to the actual initial M -
particle configuration of the subsystem under scrutiny, and the latter to the actual
configuration of particle composing the environment, including the particle configuration
of the experimental device which will register the effective measurement result.
Now, we assume that before the performance of the measurement at time t = 0, the
macroscopic pointer points in the neutral direction, i.e. the apparatus is in the “ready”
state and the system has not yet interacted with it; thus, they are initially independent
entities described by a product wave function. Running the experiment, the interaction
between the system and the experimental device will be governed exclusively by the
dynamical evolution provided by (1) and (4). Since particles’ positions of the measured
system and the experimental apparatus are always well-defined, the measurement out-
come will also be well-defined as a consequence of the theory’s formalism. Hence, the
configuration of particles (X0, Y0) will deterministically evolve at a successive time t > t0
into another configuration (Xt, Yt), corresponding to one of the possible eigenstate of
the measured operator coupled with a definite state of the macroscopic experimental
device, which will point in a definite direction expressed explicitly by Yt. In measure-
ment situations, as Passon notes, “the wavefunction of the measurement apparatus will
in general be in a superposition state. The configuration however indicates the result
of the measurement which is actually realized. That part of the wavefunction which
“guides” the particle(s) can be reasonably termed the effective wavefunction. All the
remaining parts can be ignored, since they are irrelevant for the particle dynamics. As
a result of decoherence effects [. . . ], the probability that they will produce interference
effects with the effective wavefunction is vanishingly small” (Passon (2018), p. 191).
5For the mathematical justification of this statement the reader should refer to Dürr et al. (2013),
Chapter 2, Secs. 4-7. In this regard, it is also worth noting that BM restores also a classical interpreta-
tion of quantum probabilities. These are manifestation of our ignorance about the exact positions of the
Bohmian particles and our inability to manipulate them. Thus, the maximum knowledge of particles’
configurations at our disposal in BM is provided by |ψ|2. For the specific treatment of the classical
interpretation of probabilities in BM the reader should consult Bohm (1952).
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In our example, the probability to obtain L is |α|2, similarly the probability to
obtain R is |β|2; which result will be obtained depends exclusively on (X0, Y0) and the
dynamical laws (1) and (4).6
Taking into account the Bohmian theory of measurement, three remarks are in order:
1. According to the Bohmian theory of measurement there are no superpositions
of particles in physical space, therefore the physical situation described in (3) is
avoided by construction. Consequently, macroscopic superposition are forbidden
since the particle configuration representing an experimental situation always be-
longs to only one of the possible supports of the wave function. Thus, in this
theory measurement results are functions of the primitive ontology and its dynam-
ical evolution. The physical processes responsible for the macro-objectification of
measurement outcomes are absolutely independent from external observers.
2. In BM wave functions are not subjected to stochastic jumps: the wave function’s
collapse loses its fundamental role in the dynamics of the theory, being an effect
of the interaction between subsystem and environment. Once the experimenter
looks at the final configuration of particles, then she finds the pointer in one of
the possible (macroscopic) positions corresponding to one of the possible outcomes.
Thus, within this theoretical framework by no means the observer induces or causes
the result of a given measurement.
3. As already stressed at the outset of this section, in BM the experimenter can run
the experiment and leave the lab: when she is absent the particle configuration will
certainly evolve in a definite macroscopic state of the experimental device which is
formally correlated to an eigenstate of the measured operator. Opening the lab’s
door, then, she updates her information about the outcome, but will not cause
any modification to the physical situation. In fact, it is neither her act of obser-
vation, nor her conscious perception of the measurement outcome that is causally
responsible for the observed result. Hence, if the MP is inherently related to the
macro-objectification of macroscopic states from a microscopic quantum dynamics,
then, it seems fair to claim that in BM the problem of the compatibility between
the theory’s dynamics and the observer’s definite experience of measurement re-
sults is simply dissolved.
Before concluding, it is useful to rectify some points present in Gao’s treatment of
the problem of measurement in BM. The author in Gao (2018) claims that in this theory
wave functions representing possible measurement outcomes do have tails spreading over
all configuration space. This fact entails the possibility that the particle configuration
constituting the macroscopic experimental device can be found in any point where the
amplitude of the wave function is non-zero, and therefore, that this latter cannot be
directly related with the value of the observed quantity. Again, this is not a serious
threat for the Bohmian theory of measurement, and (above all) for the explanatory
power of BM. The probability to find a particle in a given volume of space follows Born’s
rule, therefore, to find a Bohmian particle very far from the peak of its wave function is
negligible, nearly null. Hence, the joint probability to find the entire configuration of the
particles composing the macroscopic apparatus in the tail of the pointer wave function
6For technical details about the Bohmian theory of measurement and how BM solves the MP the
reader may consult Dürr and Teufel (2009), Chapter 9, Bohm (1952), Part II, Section 2 and Maudlin
(1995b).
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is so extremely small to make this objection physically insignificant. Thus, it is fair to
claim again that in BM macroscopic states not only are unambiguously generated by
the microscopic dynamics, but also are well localized in physical space. Consequently,
physical states representing measurement outcomes are those upon which mental states
of observers supervene.
Finally, speaking about the form of psycho-physical supervenience for which ob-
servers’ mental states supervene on the relative configuration of Bohmian particles, Gao
claims that
[i]f the mental state supervenes on the positions of the Bohmian particles,
then an observer can in principle know the configuration of the Bohmian
particles in her brain with a greater accuracy than that defined by the wave
function. This will allow superluminal signaling and lead to a violation of
the no-signaling theorem. (Gao (2017), p. 8)
The logic of the argument should be made clearer, since the consequent of the conditional
follows from its antecedent only in certain peculiar cases. Dürr et al. (2013), p. 74, in
fact, underline that the cases in which an observer can know more information w.r.t the
Born’s rule, are those in which it is part of the system, as in the Wigner’s friend scenario.
However, this case is not explicitly taken into account in Gao’s paper. Hence, from the
supervenience of a certain observer’s mental state - which is generally not included in the
system -, on the observation of a macroscopic pointer pointing in a definite direction,
there are no reasons for which she should know with greater precision than |ψ|2 the
positions of the Bohmian particles. On the one hand, generally she is not part of the
system and observes solely a macroscopic object, thus, she has no access whatsoever
to the precise particles’ positions; on the other, the mathematics of the theory simply
forbids this possibility, as explicitly showed in Dürr et al. (2013) and Dürr and Teufel
(2009).
4 Solution II: the GRW process
The GRW theory has been developed by the Italian physicists GianCarlo Ghirardi,
Alberto Rimini and Tullio Weber in 1986 as a theoretical framework constructed to avoid
the notorious defects of standard quantum mechanics. The fundamental assumption of
this theory states that each microscopic, elementary massive component of a physical
system can be subject to a random collapse, i.e. a spontaneous localization around
its position in space with a certain mean frequency in time. It is worth stressing that
these spontaneous processes are inherently stochastic: they are neither the result of
physical interactions, nor of observers’ consciousness. Nature, thus, is fundamentally
indeterministic according to this theoretical framework.
In order to succeed with this idea, the authors proposed to modify the fundamental
dynamical law of the quantum mechanics (1) adding stochastic terms referring to spon-
taneous random collapses of the wave function. Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber developed a
mathematical model where they made explicit how the spontaneous localization works,
i.e. explaining how a wave function is modified by this localization, where and when it
occurs.7
7What follows is heavily influenced by Ghirardi (1997), Ghirardi (2016), Bassi and Ghirardi (2003)
and Allori et al. (2008). In this section I will stick to the bra-ket notation following the usual presentation
of GRW theories.
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More specifically, Bassi and Ghirardi (2003) presented the basic assumptions of the
GRW theory as follows:
1. Each elementary component of any physical system composed by N distinguishable
massive particles is subject to random spontaneous localization processes with
mean frequency rate λ = 10−16 sec−1.
2. During the time interval between two spontaneous collapses, the system dynami-
cally evolves according to the Schrödinger equation;
3. The spontaneous localization process is described by:
|ψ〉 evolution−−−−−−→ |ψ
i
x
〉
‖|ψi
x
〉‖
where |ψi
x
〉 = Li
x
|ψ〉. Li
x
is a norm-reducing, positive, self-adjoint, linear opera-
tor in the n-particle Hilbert space H, representing the localization of ith particle
around the point x (Bassi and Ghirardi (2003), p. 298).
Let us consider the simplest case of a particle8 moving on the x axis, whose wave
function |ψ(x)〉 is not zero in an extended interval. Contrary to the wave function,
the localization function (which has a Gaussian form) Lx∗ will be different from
0 only in a very narrow interval of amplitude δ whose center is x∗; within this
interval Lx∗ has a constant value of 1/
√
δ. In this theory δ refers to the accuracy
of the spontaneous localization and it is of order of 10−7m. Then, if the particle is
randomly subjected to a spontaneous localization event in the neighbourhood of
x∗, its wave function will be changed: |ψ(x)〉 −→ NLx∗ |ψ(x)〉. The effect of the
localization process is to make the initial wave function peaked within the interval
(x∗ − δ/2,x∗ + δ/2) and approximately null outside; here N is a normalization
factor, which ensures that the particle will be found in the interval in which has
been localized if a position measurement were performed. As already pointed out
above, GRW theory states also that the frequency λ with which the collapses occur
is λ = 10−16s−1, meaning that a microscopic system is subjected to a stochastic
localization “on average, every hundred million years, while a macroscopic one
undergoes a localization every 10−7 seconds” (Ghirardi (2016)).
4. The probability density for the occurrence a of spontaneous localization at a point
x in space is Pi(x) = ‖|ψix〉‖. Consequently, the spontaneous collapses occur
with greater probability where there is a high probability, according to standard
quantum theory, to find a particle if a position measurement is performed. NB: this
8In this version of GRW theory the term ‘particle’ has not to be interpreted literally, since this theory
is only about wave functions. We use a particle language only to remain stuck to the usual jargon. Bassi
and Ghirardi made this point precise claiming that: “when we speak of “particles” we are simply using the
standard, somehow inappropriate, quantum mechanical language. Within dynamical reduction models
particles are not point-like objects which move in space following appropriate trajectories according to
the forces they are subjected to (as it is the case of, e.g., Bohmian mechanics). In dynamical reduction
models, like in standard quantum mechanics, particles are represented just by the wave function which,
in general, is spread all over the space. As we will see, the basic property of the models analyzed here
is that, when a large number of “particles” interact with each other in appropriate ways [e.g. according
to the GRW algorithm], they end up being always extremely well localized in space, leading in this way
to a situation which is perfectly adequate for characterizing what we call a “macroscopic object”. Thus,
strictly speaking there are no particles in dynamical reduction models at the fundamental level; there
is simply a microscopic, quantum, wave-like realm which gives rise to the usual classical realm at the
macroscopic level” (Bassi and Ghirardi (2003), p. 299).
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probability must not be confused with the usual quantum interpretation; rather,
it is the probability for a certain spontaneous localization event to occur at a given
point x in space.
We may summarize the GRW algorithm in a nutshell: our initial wave function
evolves according to (1) until a random localization event occurs, then, it will undergo
a spontaneous collapse with center at x∗, which is chosen randomly with probability
expressed as in point 4 above. After the random collapse, the wave function continues
to follow SE until the next stochastic jump.
After this sketchy (and naturally lacunose) presentation of the GRW process, it is
time to explain how this theory solves the MP. Reconsider the superposition |ψ〉 =
1√
2
(|ψL〉 + |ψR〉) analyzed in the previous section, recalling that the states on the
r.h.s. correspond to different orientations of a macroscopic pointer, which of course
will be observed in a definite position after the performance of an experiment. Fur-
thermore, since these pointers are composed by a huge number N of quantum particles,
we can write their wave functions as follows: |ψL〉 = |ψL(x1,x2, . . . ,xN )〉 and simi-
larly |ψR〉 = |ψR(x1,x2, . . . ,xN )〉. |ψL(x1,x2, . . . ,xN )〉 will be different from zero only
when the variables (x1,x2, . . . ,xN ) assume values in the neighborhood of L, analogously
|ψR(x1,x2, . . . ,xN )〉 will be different from zero when (x1,x2, . . . ,xN ) are in the neigh-
borhood of R. NB: the distance between L and R is much greater than δ, being the
pointers macroscopically localized in disjoint regions. Then, the total wave function can
be rewritten as follows:
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(
|ψL(x1,x2, . . . ,xN )〉+ |ψR(x1,x2, . . . ,xN )〉
)
. (5)
Suppose now that a particle xk, one the constituent of the macroscopic pointer, is
subjected to a spontaneous localization. From the principles of the theory, we know
that this random collapse can happen only in the spatial regions in which the particle
xk has a value x
∗
L in the neighborhood of L or x
∗
R in the neighborhood of R, and these
two cases may happen with the very same probability. Suppose now that the event x∗L
occurred, then multiplying L
x
∗
L
(xk) by (5) one obtains the suppression of the second
summand |ψR(x1,x2, . . . ,xN )〉, since the localization function Lx∗
L
(xk) is zero in the
neighborhood of R. Thus, we obtained the localization and the macro-objectification
of the pointer position: the localization of one of the pointer’s constituents implies
the spontaneous localization of all the particles composing it. We conclude, then, that
the necessary and sufficient condition to obtain such macro-objectification amounts to
require that one particle of its constituent will be subject to a stochastic localization
event (see Ghirardi (1997), p. 369).
If a spontaneous localization event of one of the particles composing this system
occurs, the GRW model imposes the condition according to which “this particle is con-
strained to be either in the spatial region which it occupies when the state is |ψL〉, or in
the one corresponding to |ψR〉. The linear superpositions is consequently transformed
into a statistical mixture of state |ψL〉 and |ψR〉. Since the number of differently lo-
cated particles is N , the reduction of states |ψL〉 and |ψR〉 occurs with a rate which is
amplified by a factor N with respect to the one, λi, which characterizes the elementary
spontaneous localizations” (Bassi and Ghirardi (2003), p. 305, notation adapted). It is
worth noting a quantitative fact: the number N of particles we are considering in these
physical situations is of the order of Avogadro’s number, so that for physical bodies with
macroscopic size linear superpositions are suppressed extremely rapidly, avoiding in this
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manner the problem of measurement and implying that the theory is able to explain
why macroscopic bodies have precise localizations in physical space.
From this example one concludes that the MP is easily solved since the macro-
objectification of classical devices is a mathematical consequence of the stochastic mech-
anism of the theory’s dynamics. Thus, also in this case, conscious observers do not
play any active role in the determination of measurement outcomes. Furthermore, the
observer’s mental state supervenes on a well-defined macroscopic state, which has been
unambiguously obtained from clear physical processes. As in the case of Bohmian me-
chanics, in virtue of the clear dynamical structure characterizing the spontaneous lo-
calization process, this theory does not present an incompatibility between SE and the
projection postulate, i.e GRW does not differentiate between measurement and non-
measurement interaction, nor ill-defined notions as ‘measurement’ or ‘observer’ play a
role in its physical content.
However, although this theory solves effectively the MP, it is still solely about wave
functions, thus, one may legitimate ask how macroscopic objects are obtained from
them. This fact pushed Ghirardi, Grassi and Benatti to face this issue directly by
proposing a variant of the theory adding a primitive ontology of matter density field,
the so called GRWm theory. To describe the distribution of matter in physical space,
GRWm introduces a continuous matter density field in addition to the wave function,
representing it with the variable m(x, t), which is defined for every spatial point x ∈ R3
and every instant of time t. Clearly, this field can have zero values in some point of
space, i.e. where there is no matter.9 This theory, therefore, is about the dynamical
behaviour of a matter density field in space and time, whose evolution is determined
by the wave function. Another well-known variant of GRW theory implements a flash
ontology (proposed in the first place in Bell (1987), Chapter 22), where flashes are
discrete material points in space-time. The wave function in this modification of GRW
theory governs the evolution of flashes, which correspond bijectively to wave function
collapses. In a nutshell this theory tells us that matter, i.e. the primitive ontology, is
defined as the set of flashes in space at every instant of time; macroscopic bodies are
therefore emergent from the distribution of such flashes.
GRWm and GRWf solve the measurement problem exactly as GRW does, but spon-
taneous collapses now concern physical fields and flashes respectively, i.e matter in space,
not only wave functions. Conscious observers, hence, play no role in the physics of these
theories. More specifically, in these two variants of GRW theory macroscopic point-
ers, as any other macroscopic object, is composed by matter evolving in physical space
according to precise dynamical laws, so that measurement outcomes, as in the case of
BM, are just functions of their primitive ontologies and their dynamical evolution. The
schema we have seen in the previous section replicates perfectly.
From what has been said, it follows that GRW theories solve the MP without any
reference to external observers (and their consciousness). Exactly as in the case of BM,
the experimenter can perform a measurement, leave the laboratory and be certain that
the observation will produce a particular outcome. The missing information, hence,
concerns which outcome has been produced. As in BM, the experimenter’s observation
has only the consequence to update her knowledge regarding the obtained result.
As a corollary to this conclusion, one can state that in virtue of the primitive ontolo-
gies and the clear dynamical laws of GRW theories, the determinate-experience problem
vanishes as in the Bohmian case.
9For a accessible and precise presentation of the basic ideas of GRWm the reader may refer to
Ghirardi (2016), Section 11, for technical details see Ghirardi et al. (1995).
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5 Conclusion
In conclusion, the fundamental disagreement with Gao amounts to his claim that the
MP reduces to a determinate-experience problem. According to the present author, he
overlooks that the MP appears well before the introduction of observer’s consciousness,
being it a problem concerning the localization of macroscopic states from an obscure
microscopic dynamics. More precisely, in this essay I have argued that the problem of
measurement in the context of quantum mechanics is essentially a mathematical conse-
quence of the theory’s formalism, translating into a physical problem consisting in the
amplification on a macroscopic scale of microscopic superpositions.
To summarize, in Section 2 I argued that it is not correct to define the MP a
determinate-experience problem, and therefore, Gao’s mentalistic reformulation is not
helpful to understand the causes of the issue in the theory’s formalism. In that section,
it has been eventually shown that the physical definition of the MP does not reduce to
its mentalistic variant.
In Section 3 and 4 I have considered the solutions to the MP offered respectively
by Bohmian mechanics and GRW theories, clarifying some questionable statements con-
tained in Gao (2017) about these theoretical frameworks. I have argued that according to
these quantum theories measurement outcomes are just function of the theories’ ontolo-
gies and dynamics. Moreover, it has been shown, explaining how measurement outcomes
are obtained in these frameworks, that the act of observation by a conscious observer
does not play any role in the macro-objectification of physical states.
In other words, observers in a Bohmian universe or in a universe described by GRWm
or GRWf, always have definite perceptions of macroscopic (well-localized) states in virtue
of the primitive ontology and the dynamical laws of these theories, i.e. their mental states
always supervene on physical state representing measurement outcomes. Thus, in these
frameworks the determinate-experience problem simply vanishes.
Concluding one may also say that psychophysical supervenience is a substantial
assumption in the philosophy of mind. Interactionist dualists, for instance, deny it.
Nevertheless, in order to define the measurement problem and to understand how QM,
BM and GRW theories solve it, there is absolutely no point to commit to a particular
position in philosophy of mind, or to reintroduce again the mind into the physics of
quantum theory.
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